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Lawyers reading this excellent social and historical analysis of
medical care in America might well suppose its subtitle should read
"Eat Your Heart Out, Counselor!" The importance of the law to our
nation-to our cultural arrangements as well as our institutions-has
not been matched by an intensity of interest among social scientists
comparable to that shown in the social and historical evolution of
medicine.1 This imbalance may of course be due to the fact that health
care consumes an ever-expanding part of our economy. But there is
more-for the fascination that sociologists and historians have with
medicine also results (as it does for the rest of us) from awe in the face
of birth, pain, and death, and from wonder and admiration at the interventions of physicians that save lives and alleviate suffering.
A related source of intraprofessional envy lies in the history recounted by Professor Starr, particularly in the first half of his book,
which he labels "Book One: A Sovereign Profession." Would not any
lawyer be jealous of the progress the medical profession in the United
States has made in transforming itself from a disorganized, disre- Professor of Law, Ethics and Public Policy, University Law Center. B.A. 1966,
Swarthmore College; LL.B. 1969, Yale University; M.A. (hon.) 1975, University of
Pennsylvania.
' Regrettably, Professor Starr himself does not remedy the imbalance. Despite
some use of comparative data (especially in showing differences between developments
in the medical profession in the United States and those in England and Europe), he
fails to compare and contrast the legal profession with the medical profession. He does,
however, make very good use in his book of previous studies of medicine, including a
number by leading scholars from the University of Pennsylvania such as Renee Fox,
Charles Rosenberg, and Rosemary Stevens. R. STEVENS, AMERICAN MEDICINE AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1971) is particularly influential, along with E. FREIDSON,
PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE (1970); E.
FREIDSON, PROFESSION OF MEDICINE: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF APPLIED
KNOWLEDGE (1970); W. ROTHSTEIN, AMERICAN PHYSICIANS IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY: FROM SECTS TO SCIENCE (1972); R. SHRYOCK, MEDICINE IN AMERICA

(1966), and the classic writings of Weber, Parsons, and Merton among others.
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spected, and generally disdained calling as late as the end of the nineteenth century into the country's most highly regarded and prosperous
profession, possessed of enormous economic significance and political
influence? Despite their relative affluence and ingrained role in society,' lawyers are not able today to lay claim to cultural authority or
occupational control comparable to that of their medical counterparts.
Yet the real reason that readers of law reviews should also be
readers of The Social Transformationof American Medicine3 goes well
beyond one's motivation to lean on the fence and wonder how one's
neighbor gets such a green lawn. In the corporate field, for instance,
lawyers will find that health care is of great concern because insurance
premiums are a major part of employee benefits (and hence part of the
cost of every product). Moreover, many lawyers work for corporations
directly involved in one of the many facets of health care. Lawyers involved in government regulation on both state and federal levels will
find the book fascinating, not only in its technical but also in its political aspects. And all Americans should be concerned with a segment of
modern life that has repeatedly posed crises not only for the nation's
pocketbook but also for its conscience. We lawyers claim to be concerned with questions of justice. What kind of a society, however, scrupulously observes the niceties of due process for the few that come
before its courts yet fails adequately to provide for care of the many
who have need of its hospitals and healers?
I.
Professor Starr sets out to demonstrate, in Book One, that the

privileged and powerful position of medicine in America today was not
foreordained by either historical position or the rise of science. Rather,
Professor Starr argues, the origins of power of the medical profession
are a function of political, economic, and cultural forces that are all at
work in the health care and medical professions. It is true that patients
in need of care are in a dependent position;" but such dependency does

not lead inevitably to great power or to a unified profession. Consider
the relationship between the members of another ancient profession and
2 For example (and on the simplest level), the National Institutes of Health and
the Health Care Financing Administration, unlike the Supreme Court, are not parts of
our basic constitutional structure, although of course it is merely historical fact and not
a requirement that the Justices (like most judges on inferior courts) are lawyers.
3 P. STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE (1982).
4 Professor Starr notes how "[p]hysicians offer a kind of individualized objectivity,

a personal relationship as well as authoritative counsel. The very circumstances of sickness promote acceptance of their judgment." Id. at 5.
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their supplicants: not all sinners in need of salvation go to the same
church, nor do they expect ministers to exercise broad social authority.
In earlier times, Americans may have been as preoccupied as they
are today with health and well-being (as demonstrated by a long-term
attachment to popular movements such as those concerned with diet
and exercise), 5 but they sought it through a variety of healers other
than those trained in medical school. And with good reason, for many
people with medical degrees actually had little formal education and
possessed only meager skills. Even the most respected and learned physicians (who typically had studied in England and Scotland, or on the
continent) had to rely on such a primitive body of knowledge and such
a small bag of remedies that their major function was to provide comfort and consolation. The ancient admonition-primum non nocere
(above all, do no harm)-was wise counsel: the physician was likely to
be of greatest assistance by intervening as little as possible and by
merely supporting the patient, while nature resolved the illness.
But all of this did little to endow medical doctors with the Godlike aura that they possess today. In many ways, physicians were in no
better position to help their patients than were the various "lay healers," who did everything from prescribing botanical remedies to setting
bones.' The relative lack of helpful skills meant that the profession
faced substantial barriers to establishing its own legitimacy in the eyes
of the community. Its fractionation into competing schools of thought
and the wide variation in social class and education among its practitioners also left it short of a consensus about its goals and identity.
Beginning in the colonial era, American physicians had departed
from the three-part structure that had prevailed in England.7 At the top
of the English hierarchy were physicians, a small, elite group of Oxbridge-educated gentlemen, who did not physically intervene in cases
(they only observed, speculated, and prescribed), followed by surgeons
(who engaged in manual tasks and had been members of the same
guild as barbers until 1745), and, finally, by apothecaries, the most
5 Professor Starr writes:
Since the 1830s. . . the United States has been swept by a series of popular movements concerned with improving health variously through diet,
exercise, moral purity, positive thinking, and religious faith. Today . . .
Americans [are] jogging in parks, shopping in health food stores, talking
psychobabble, and reading endless guides to keeping fit, eating right, and
staying healthy ...

Id. at 7.
8 See id. at 47-49 (lay healers included botanic practitioners, midwives, cancer
doctors, bonesetters, inoculators, abortionists, and sellers of nostrums).
" See id. at 37-38.
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numerous group, who could charge for drugs but not for their advice.
Even when a movement began in the 1760's to create a stronger identity for the profession-such as by the establishment of the first American medical school in 1765 at the University of Pennsylvania8 (then the
College of Philadelphia)-the predominant mode remained democratic
and competitive, with the result that by 1850 France had three medical
schools, while the United States had forty-two.9
Throughout most of the nineteenth century, this lack of legitimacy
and cohesion kept the medical profession from gaining much authority.
Indeed, developments in the larger society conspired to retard physicians' attempts to improve their positions. Professor Starr shows how
the century's characteristic "double movement"'-the expansion of the
free market into every sphere of social life coupled with "social protectionism" that tried to counteract the resulting harsh consequences for
traditional institutions-played out in medicine: on the one hand, the
nascent (and largely ineffective and unenforced) licensing laws were attacked by economic liberals, who wanted people to be free to obtain
treatment from whomever they wished, and, on the other hand, charity
and government intervention (in the drug area, for example) increased,
as many perceived a growing need to protect people from harm.
Eventually, of course, the medical profession improved its position.
Once again, Professor Starr attempts to discredit many of the conventional explanations for the eventual change in the profession's fortunes.
For example, he points out that the famous report on medical schools
by Abraham Flexner" played more the role of reporting changes already underway than of initiating them. By the time it was published
in 1910, the proprietary medical colleges, which accounted for a large
portion of the 162 schools then in existence, were already facing severe
pressures from state licensing boards setting higher standards for the
length of education and the requisite quality of laboratory and clinical
facilities.' 2 Moreover, a clear alternative had emerged in the universityaffiliated medical schools, which were requiring more extensive preparI See id. at 40-41 ("By establishing medical schools on American soil, physicians
hoped to create a profession in the European image. . . . If physic was to be a learned
profession, it had to have a seat of professional learning.").
' See id. at 42. A medical education encompassed two years of three to four
months' study each, and until 1850, the second year consisted solely of repeating the
courses given in the first. See id. at 43.
"0Professor Starr refers to K. POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 61
(1944) for an articulation of this phenomenon.
11 See P. STARR, supra note 3, at 118-21 (citing and discussing A.
MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA,

(1910)).
12

See P.

STARR,

supra note 2, at 118-19.
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atory education and longer training."3
In place of the conventional explanations, Professor Starr points to
the power that the medical profession slowly accreted because of "institutionalized forms of dependence.""'4 He shows that, even when they
were managed by nonmedical boards, hospitals were increasingly forced
to rely on physicians for business-namely, the admission of patients-as the hospitals were transformed from dispensers of charity
(almshouses) to institutions of medical science. 5 Even more interestingly, Professor Starr traces changes in the authority of physicians to
other developments in society at large, such as improvements in transportation and communication, which made the practice of medicine
more efficient. Once physicians were able to schedule appointments in
their offices and to respond quickly to emergencies (with the growth of
the telephone after 1870), they could organize their time more economically. As rapid transportation became readily available, patients could
more conveniently visit their physicians, and physicians' schedules were
consequently less disrupted since they no longer had to go out to see
patients. Whereas summoning a physician to the home of a sick person
had once been an arduous process (on both sides)-with the result that
a physician, travelling long distances by horse or wagon, might see only
a few patients a day-the growth of cities and the availability of
automobiles made it easier for patients to come to physicians at the
office or hospital."6
A part of the improvement in the position of physicians thus seems
to have sociological roots. Physicians arriving at their patients' homes
are in a less powerful position (however grateful the patients may
sometimes be) than when the patient makes the trip and visits the physician on the latter's turf. Furthermore, the ability of a single physician
to care for a larger number of patients not only increased the physician's income, but also gave her practice a broader base and freed the
physician from having to rely on the patronage of a few rich patients
(the only route previously available for the ambitious doctor).'
"' When it opened in 1893, Johns Hopkins University became the first school to
require a college diploma and a four-year medical program. See id. at 115. At Harvard
Medical School "[tihe academic year was extended from four months to nine; the
length of training needed to graduate rose from two years to three.. . . Students henceforth would have to pass all their courses to graduate." Id. at 114. The University of
Pennsylvania followed Harvard's lead and extended medical training from two to three
years. Id. at 115.
14 Id. at 144.
1 See id. at 147-69.
16 See id. at 65-71.
17 Further, many of the new patients came from the middle class, so that most
physicians could now presume both social equality to and (in most instances) educa-
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In emphasizing such factors, however, Professor Starr downplays a
little too much another traditional explanation for the greatly enlarged
authority of physicians in the twentieth century: the growth in the scientific basis of medicine.' 8 Admittedly, this factor has probably been
credited with playing too large a role in explaining the spectacular increase in the influence of the medical profession in modern America.
But the growth of scientific knowledge greatly increased the powers of
the trained professional to do things that were beyond the ability of the
ordinary mortal limited to common sense or folk customs. This seems to
me an absolutely essential underpinning to the other factors that Professor Starr so rightly emphasizes, such as changes in the broader society. One wonders, for example, whether a patient would have been
equally impressed with the medical profession when visiting the physician's office were it not for all the visible accouterments of scientific
medicine found there. Evidence of scientific gains reinforced the patient's sense of awe as effectively as whatever the practitioner actually
accomplished by way of cure. This is not to say that Professor Starr
ignores the effect that scientific developments and increased clinical sophistication had on the practice of medicine and on the creation of a
collective identity for the profession, merely that he underplays it. 9
As Professor Starr makes clear, the eventual transformation of the
medical profession into a powerful and rather cohesive group by the
1920's cannot be regarded as the unfolding of some inevitable process.
Rather, the profession-particularly its organizational and academic
leaders-skillfully used each new attribute of power to gain more
power. They dissuaded "ethical" drug companies from dealing directly
tional superiority over their patients.
18 See P. STARR, supra note 3, at 6 ("In the world today, not all societies with
scientifically advanced medical institutions have powerful medical professions.. . . The
growth of science . . . does not assure physicians broad cultural authority, economic
power, or political influence . . ").
19 For example, in discussing the increase in office practice, Professor Starr claims
that a "very deep-run current to segregate pain and illness as private events reinforced
the desire of more prosperous families to receive physicians in the privacy of their own
homes," rather than in offices and hospitals, which carried "a mark of lower status."
Id. at 75-76. Yet his description of the factors that changed patients' attitudes is vague
(indeed, almost circular): "It is a measure of the changing position of the profession
and medicine's success in overcoming the feelings of delicacy accentuated by the Victorian sensibility that this stigma was gradually overcome." Id. at 76. What, then, caused
such a powerful change in the profession's position? And what fueled "medicine's success," in light of the fact that many of the expanding number of patients were from the
middle class, the very group most imbued with "Victorian sensibility"? Could it be that
this group was the most impressed with the scientific trappings of the profession, which
justified treating medicine increasingly as a fit subject for commerce, to be purchased in
its own marketplace, rather than as a form of ritualized hand-holding to be dispensed
at the bedside by a kindly old man with a small bag of ancient potions?
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with the public, fought all forms of the "corporate practice of
medicine" by insurance companies and hospitals that wanted physicians
to serve as employees rather than as independent practitioners,
and-perhaps most to their own discredit and to their communities'
harm-they constructed barriers to public health reform. What is remarkable about the power that physicians obtained, as Professor Starr
writes, is that it was gained through "belief rather than force, . . . the
success of its claims to competence and understanding rather than the
strong arm of the police." 2 Nonetheless, the growing cultural authority
of the profession (which aided physicians in resisting the efforts of both
the state and the corporations to control health care) was itself a product of other factors, particularly the ever increasing powers of biomedicine, that not only placed physicians in a pivotal role as the common person's link to advanced science but also provided an acceptable
basis and rationale for collective solidarity.
II.
The description of the profession's "Escape from the Corporation," as Professor Starr entitles the final chapter in Book One, provides an excellent bridge to Book Two, "The Struggle for Medical
Care." The chapters in this part have two purposes: first and foremost,
to trace the growth of outside powers over medical care, and second, to
anticipate the increasing role played by "for-profit" corporations in this
field.
The first of these subjects could well be described as a slowly maturing Faustian bargain. Looking over the past fifty-five years (from
the inauguration at Baylor University Hospital in 1929 of a program of
prepaid hospital care that grew into the Blue Cross system), 21 one
would have to conclude that physicians have done extremely well by
this bargain. Not only did the plans for hospital-and later physician-insurance (Blue Shield) protect (indeed, greatly enhance) physicians' earnings, but by satisfying the needs of many consumers, they
served as a bulwark against cooperative health plans, commercial insurance companies, and compulsory, state-mandated (or even state-run)
health insurance. The success of this development confounded the experts, because it violated actuarial principles and other accepted insur-

ance practices2 2 ; eventually, however, the very success of the medically
Id. at 229.
See id. at 295.
Actuaries feared that the inadequacy of available statistics would result in unpredictable losses. Others feared open-ended policies because they were "like blank
20

21
22
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initiated insurance plans proved their undoing. Physician control of the
system meant not only that physicians' interests were given priority,
albeit with public obeisance to consumers,2" but that the system grew
rich. This made it attractive to entrepreneurs and vulnerable to outside
controls when times got hard.
Ironically, the very power and influence gained by the profession
may have been its Achilles' heel. For example, physicians' authority
was sufficient to require Congress to make certain compromises when
federal financing was legislated on a large scale in the mid-1960's. In
order to get the program enacted, reformers gave in to the American
Medical Association (AMA) and other lobbyists and agreed that the
federal government would not become directly involved in supervising
but would instead funnel its funds through the existing insurance plans,
in the role of "financial intermediaries" that would supervise disbursements. Thus, billions of dollars were poured into a system whose "costplus" mode of operation virtually ensured that any competent health
care administrator could turn a profit.
This financial lure attracted profit-making firms (in increasingly
large chains of institutions rather than single hospitals) run by people
used to setting performance targets and marshalling resources (including personnel) to meet those objectives. Moreover, as the groups who
really pay the piper (both the federal government and private employers) became concerned by the spiral of medical prices, they decided that
they wanted to call more of the tunes. As the terms of the programs
became less generous, nonprofit institutions also felt forced to exercise
tighter management controls and to provide incentives in order to alter
the behavior of health care personnel, particularly physicians.24 Following the lead of their "for-profit" counterparts, nonprofit facilities are
forming large multi-institutional chains, hiring outside management
checks" and violated the concept of limited liability. See id. at 298.
23 For example, C. Rufus Rorem, who as an expert for the American Hospital
Association presided over the birth of Blue Cross, see id. at 297-98, opposed the singlehospital plans that were first developed on the ground that they interfered with subscribers' "freedom of choice." As Professor Starr points out, however, it is unclear
why subscribers would have had less choice if they could choose from a
variety of plans offered by hospitals in their community. The AHA did
not encourage community-wide plans in addition to single-hospital plans,
but instead of them. In this respect it denied consumers the choice of contracting with a single-hospital plan and possibly securing a more favorable
price.
Id. at 297.
24 See, e.g., Capron & Gray, Between You and Your Doctor, Wall St. J., Feb. 6,
1984, at 24, col. 3 (discussing profit-sharing plans established by hospitals to reward
physicians who help reduce costs).
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consultants, imposing increasingly explicit controls on physicians' decisions, and even setting up profit-making subsidiaries. All in all, the
health care industry (and that now seems the appropriate term) is one
of the most rapidly evolving in the entire economy.
Today, as the goose seems at risk of choking on its own golden
egg, it is interesting to remember that physicians foresaw from the beginning the very things that have come to pass. In the mid-1930's, the
AMA insisted, for instance, that the only acceptable restrictions on
treatment were those "formulated and enforced by the organized medical profession." 2 5 Furthermore, the AMA initially insisted that all insurance payments go directly to the patient, so that physicians would
not become subject to the dictates of an organized payer.26 Similarly,
many physicians, "like those who wrote the [Committee on the Costs of
Medical Care] minority report, suspected

. . .

that any financial inter-

mediary would ultimately impose controls on their incomes. 1 7
Plainly, this oversimplifies a complex story. Yet I think that, for
all the exceptions and side roads taken by health care (and traced by
Professor Starr), the predominant.trend remained. The great storehouse
of collective authority that had been slowly accumulated by the medical
profession was cashed in for a reimbursement system that for a time
added further to physicians' power, in part by adding immensely to
their wealth.28 But eventually the system grew too large and complex
and became too entwined in the economy and the government for
medicine to continue to control it.
As a consequence, medicine today is entering an environment that
is reminiscent in many ways of that at the turn of the century. Again,
for example, physicians (particularly those just entering the profession)
are taking employment with hospitals, health plans, free-standing clinics, and private companies; employers, concerned about the expense of
health benefits, are placing limits on the types or setting of care for
covered employees, thus promoting competition among health care
providers; and, generally, physicians are having to relinquish some of
the extraordinary control and power they have amassed during the past
26 Minutes of the Eighty-Fifth Annual Session of the American Medical Association, Held at Cleveland, June 11-15, 1934, 102 J. A.M.A. 2109, 2201 (1934) (recommending that there be "no restrictions on treatment or prescribing not formulated
and enforced by the organized medical profession").
26 Today a major means of asserting control over physicians' practices is to insist
that they accept "assignment"-meaning that their charges are limited to the amount
paid directly to them by the insurance program.
2 P. STARR, supra note 3, at 299.
28 Physicians' interests in research and in improvements in their institutions, particularly acute-care hospitals, were also amply supported by the government and private philanthrophy. See, e.g., id. at 338-351.
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sixty years.
Many of these changes are beneficial. The financing of health
care, in particular, needs to be shaken-up. If greater competition among
health care providers promotes greater information for consumers, that
too is good. Even the entry of profit-making institutions may have a
positive effect, particularly if it brings additional sources of capital into
the system at a time when the federal government is reducing its
commitment.2 9
But some distinctly worrisome features are also emerging in the
health care industry, as the second part of Professor Starr's work makes
clear. From my viewpoint, the most disturbing of these features is the
diminished access to health care among the poorer members of society.
Tens of millions of people still lack adequate health care, despite the
billions of dollars being expended by the federal government (to say
nothing of private funds)."0 Few nations spend a larger proportion of
their GNP on health care than America does, yet many can claim better health care statistics (in terms of infant mortality and adult longevity, for example).3 One cannot simply dismiss such comparisons by asserting that the health of a population depends on more than medical
care-of course that is true, but in this country the heavy emphasis on
physician-mediated acute health care (at the expense of public health
and preventive measures) is a cardinal feature of the very "triumph" of
the medical profession, as recounted by Professor Starr.
The increasing role that for-profit institutions in health care (especially hospitals, walk-in "urgicenters," and nursing homes) are playing
underlines the subtle contextual changes that are occurring. Medicine is
moving further and further away from being an altruistic calling, often
practiced in charitable settings, toward being a sale of a commercial
29 One unusual recent development was the transfer of Dr. William C. DeVries'
artificial heart implantation program from the University of Utah to the Humana
Heart Institute in Louisville. The promise of Humana, Inc., one of the largest "forprofit" hospital chains, to fund 100 heart implants (estimated at $250,000 each) dwarfs
the funds that the University of Utah was able to raise for this research. See Altman,
Surgeon's Move Highlights Controversial Trends, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1984, at C3,
col. 2. Humana is not a charitable institution, however. A 1980 Fortune magazine
article cited by Professor Starr quotes a Humana official with respect to an uninsured
heart attack patient's transfer (after one day's treatment at a Humana hospital) to a
public hospital where he died: "These. freebies cost $2,000 or $3,000 a day. Who's
going to pay for them?" Kinkead, Humana'sHard-Sell Hospitals,FORTUNE, Nov. 17,

1980, at 68, 81 (quoting Dr. Karl Fazekas).
30 See 1 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR

THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN

SECURING AccESs TO
90-108 (1983).
Si Professor Starr notes that Americans have "higher infant mortality rates and
lower life expectancy than most Europeans." P. STARR, supra note 3, at 382.
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND

HEALTH CARE

BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH,
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product in the marketplace.3 2 Needless to say, this development has
raised concerns for many people, most notably Dr. Arnold Relman, editor of the prestigious New EnglandJournal of Medicine, who wrote

in 1980 of the problems with a "new medical-industrial complex."133
Professor Starr identifies five dimensions of the phenomenon.
Among these, he emphasizes the shift from nonprofit and governmental
organization to for-profit companies and the concentration of ownership
at the regional and national (rather than the local) level. 34 Professor
Starr reports that although the nonprofit chains account for many more
beds than those in the profit-making organizations, the latter have
grown much faster3 5 (even though their easiest period of
growth-through acquisition of certain attractive, locally run proprietary or voluntary hospitals-is behind them). For-profit companies will
unquestionably have a significant impact on the organization and delivery of health services, particularly because this segment of the industry
is concentrated in fewer, larger organizations than is the nonprofit sector. If we are going to respond well to these developments, we will need
to know the effects of a corporate-style profit motive on physicians' behavior, on the costs of care, on access to care, and on the overall "system" of health care in each community.
Yet, in some ways, I believe the emphasis on the profit-making
side of these organizations focuses the spotlight on that aspect of the
change that is less important, although perhaps more controversial.
Professor Starr is right when he observes that, although physicians and
hospitals have been preoccupied with government regulation, "they
may be on their way to losing their autonomy to another master."" 6 But
in explaining that the for-profit chains have introduced "managerial
32 Plainly, this is no ordinary market, because patients often do not (and sometimes really cannot, due to their limited knowledge) act like ordinary "consumers," and
health insurance has profound effects on decisions about "purchases."
33 See Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 303 NEw ENG. J. MED.
963 (1980) (discussing the recent and unprecedented rise in new industries that supply
health-care services for profit, such as proprietary hospitals and laboratory services, and
its impact on economic efficiency and national health policy). The "old" medical-industrial complex refers

to the linkages between doctors, hospitals, and medical schools and the
health insurance companies, drug manufacturers, medical equipment suppliers, and other profitmaking firms. Their interests seemed so closely interlocked that they constituted . . . a common front for a particular style,
structure, and distribution of medical care.
P. STARR,

34 Id.

35
31

supra note 3, at 428-429.
at 429.

Id. at 430.
Id. at 428.
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capitalism into American medicine on a large scale,"3 7 he emphasizes
the capitalist component; I think the managerial mode itself is at least
as significant.
Thus far, the nonprofit chains have been less quick to replace local
boards with central ones and to vest authority with managers rather
than with boards. But under the mounting pressures to ensure institutional solvency in the face of new payment formulae, the need to protect against malpractice liability, and requirements for data to fulfill
governmental and accreditation rules, one can be sure that the managerial style of the nonprofits will move even closer to their for-profit siblings. One way or another, rules will be prescribed, power will be given
to managers and committees, and the discretion of individual physicians
will be increasingly limited.
This loss of discretion and control does not necessarily mean less
effective care for patients. It might, if bureaucratic convenience and institutional objectives replace medical judgment. But if better management leads to more efficient use of physicians' time (for example,
through division of labor and better materials for communication with
patients) and elimination of certain perverse incentives (for example,
the greater financial reward to physicians that now comes under most
forms of insurance in doing something, rather than in observing and
inquiring), better management could mean better care. Moreover, the
dominance of institutional objectives over patient needs-which is now
being lamented-is actually nothing new; the change is that, in the
past, institutional interests were congruent with those of the medical
profession, which controlled most health care institutions. In other
words, the shift in power, to the extent it is occurring, is from physician
to manager, not from patient to manager. Thus far, the greater role for
nonphysicians in health care has merely resulted from corporate planners stepping into the void created by physicians' keeping public planners at bay. If a greater role for institutional officials also opened the
door to greater public accountability, then it could ameliorate what
Professor Starr characterizes as one of the greatest failings of the health
care system as it evolved in this century.
But reducing physicians' authority could also have some undesirable results. Much of the private law of physician-patient relations in
the past quarter-century has involved a struggle (waged by lawyers in
what often seems to be a half-hearted fashion) to increase patients' autonomy at the expense of physicians.3 Would it not be ironic if the
37 Id. at 431.
38 See J. AREEN,
MEDICINE

P.

KING, S.

GOLDBERG

&

A.

CAPRON, LAW, SCIENCE AND

353-415 (1984) (discussing informed consent and other uses of private con-
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legal rules that have emerged were to undermine the physician's emerging role as the advocate for and protector of the patient in her relationship with health care institutions that may have strongly conflicting interests of their own? This does not mean that the gains made for
patients in these cases need to be disavowed, merely that those responsible for the continuing evolution of the law in this area should be sensitive to the important but subtle changes that are taking place in the
settings in which care is provided and decisions are made. They should
be joined in this enterprise by the true leaders of the medical profession, who will realize that the best buttress for physicians' legitimate
authority is their clear demonstration that the needs and interests of
their patients take precedence over all else, be it their own convenience
or preferences or, more disturbingly, the financial benefit of third
parties.
I trust that Professor Starr will be among those contributing to an
analysis of the changes in health care brought about by the organizational developments that he outlines at the end of his book. Because the
rest of the volume is so good, it would be ungrateful to complain that
the final chapter is too brief and superficial. Better to say that, judging
from The Social Transformation of American Medicine, any contribution he chooses to make will be informative, careful, sweeping but sufficiently detailed, and very readable. I recommend the present volume to
anyone who wants to know not only whence health care in America has
come, but whither it is going as well.

trol exercised by individuals over medicine and science); J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD
59-84 (1984) (discussing the history and legal status of the
informed consent doctrine and the "symbolic significance of the call for patient selfdetermination").
OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT

